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Introduction: Understanding the 
Transformational Power of China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative
Chay Yue Wah and Thomas Menkhoff
This book features several introductory readings about the “Belt and 
Road Initiative” (BRI), a strategic development initiative launched by 
the Chinese Government under the leadership of President Xi Jinping 
in 2013 to jointly build an economic belt along the Silk Road. Some 
of the key objectives of BRI, previously known as One Belt, One 
Road (OBOR) or Silk Road Economic Belt, include promoting infra-
structure development, trade and investments in Asia, Europe and 
Africa. BRI is a gigantic development initiative whose key compo-
nents include the creation of several interconnected economic land 
corridors (=belts): China–Mongolia–Russia; China–Central Asia–
West Asia, China–Pakistan, the China–Indochina peninsula and 
Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar. 
BRI’s evolving overland infrastructure network includes the 
“New Eurasian Land Bridge” (see Figure 1) which consists of several 
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rail corridors linking Yiwu in eastern China with European destina-
tions such as Duisburg (Germany), Madrid (Spain) or London (UK). 
A noteworthy case is the Belgrade–Budapest Railway project that 
will eventually link the Greek ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki with 
the economic and trade partners in Eastern Europe. Once construc-
tion is completed by the end of 2023, planners envisage that the 
Budapest–Belgrade railway line will be the fastest transport route 
between Greece and the interior of Europe. Stakeholders see in the 
Budapest–Belgrade line a grand flagship project, which shows that 
China is capable of working according to EU construction standards 
and legal requirements with regard to fair competition and prevention 
of dishonest or fraudulent conduct. While the European Union (EU) 
and China have built a deep, strategic partnership over the years, 
there are also critics who have cautioned that a new eastern entryway 
to markets in Western Europe (WE) will carry a significant economic 
price for many European countries, for instance, China’s increasing 
Figure 1.  A map of the BRI
Source: Reproduced with the kind permission from Mercator Institute for China Studies 
(MERICS), Berlin, Germany.
b3532_FM.indd   24 14-Aug-19   11:44:49 AM
b3532  China’s Belt and Road Initiative: 9”x6” 
diplomatic and commercial influence as well as greater control (e.g. 
over resources) through sheer physical connectivity. 
The “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” is a complementary ini-
tiative to promote maritime-related development in countries adjoin-
ing the South China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean and the Indian 
Ocean. It envisions the development of key seaports along traditional 
and new sea routes to Southeast Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean 
region with good connectivity to land-based transportation routes. 
Port development with “Chinese engagement” from Port Klang in 
Malaysia to Sri Lanka, to Gwadar in Pakistan, to gulf state ports in the 
Middle East, to Piraeus in Greece and beyond, provide a string of 
valuable pearls in the form of harbours from which adjoining areas 
can be serviced through feeder vessels or railway lines by Chinese 
government-linked companies.
BRI is a gigantic regional integration project that involves 
more than 60 countries in Asia, Oceania, East Africa and Europe. 
Funding and support is available from new financial institutions 
established by the Chinese Government such as the Silk Road Fund 
(US$40 billion) founded in 2014 (http://www.silkroadfund.com.
cn/enweb/23773/index.html) and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) formed in 2016. AIIB is “a multilateral 
development bank with a mission to improve social and economic 
outcomes in Asia and beyond” (https://www.aiib.org/en/about-
aiib/index.html). Its headquarters is located in Beijing. AIIB has 80 
approved members from various parts of the world: “By investing in 
sustainable infrastructure and other productive sectors today, we 
will better connect people, services and markets that over time will 
impact the lives of billions and build a better future” (https://www.
aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html).
The “Central belt” is aimed at integrating countries in Central 
and West Asia with linkages to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean 
Sea. Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan urgently require large-scale infrastruc-
ture investments, and the BRI is seen as a welcome source of funds 
and support. One of the completed projects in Kazakhstan is the 
Khorgos dry port that connects China and Kazakhstan (see Figure 2).
b3532_FM.indd   25 14-Aug-19   11:44:49 AM
b3532  China’s Belt and Road Initiative 9”x6”
Figure 2.  Examples of BRI projects
Source: Nikkei Asian Review 28/3/2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/
Is-China-s-Belt-and-Road-working-A-progress-report-from-eight-countries.
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A key cooperative project between Kazakhstan and China is the 
emerging Western Europe–Western China (WE–WC) Expressway, 
which will connect the port of Lianyungang, on the Yellow Sea in 
China, to the port at St. Petersburg, on the Baltic Sea in Russia. 
WE–WC is mainly funded by The World Bank’s IBRD (International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development), Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The WE–WC 
Expressway is positioned as a core element of a newly emerging mul-
timodal transport system that will comprise other highways, railway 
lines and transport hubs, interlacing China, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), Eastern Europe, South Asia and the 
Middle East with Kazakhstan as Eurasia’s logistical heart. Economic 
benefits include reduced travel time, industrial development, job crea-
tion, domestic tourism and increasing tax revenues.
Besides further extending the belt to countries in South Asia and 
Southeast Asia (=South belt) via new rail lines such as the high-speed 
railway project linking China to Thailand’s ports, the strategy is to 
create a “North belt”, connecting Central Asia, Russia and Europe. 
China’s President Xi Jinping has promoted a plan to create a Northern 
Sea Route (NSR) (=“Ice Silk Road”) in collaboration with Russia, 
with emphasis on oil and gas exploration in the Arctic region, includ-
ing shipping, infrastructure construction, tourism and science (see 
Figure 3). 
As a country with massive expertise in building roads, tunnels, 
bridges, high-speed trains for rail projects, etc., China’s BRI seems to 
be a logical outcome of the country’s domestic development approach 
with its emphasis on infrastructure development. Besides its forte as a 
massive transformational development force directed at the underde-
veloped Eurasian landmass, BRI can also be seen as a strategy to 
address China’s uneven development of inland western regions and 
the prosperous eastern seaboard states. Instead of investing more state 
funds on underdeveloped provinces within China, regional economic 
integration is seen as a more effective approach towards poverty alle-
viation and sustainable development. 
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A related case of interest in the overall scheme of the BRI is the 
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which connects Kashgar in 
the landlocked Xinjiang with the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan (where the 
China Overseas Ports Holding Company has an operating lease). The 
development of corridor-related road upgrading works have angered 
India because they are conducted in Gilgit–Baltistan which is a part of the 
greater Kashmir region, a disputed territory that is the subject of a long-
standing conflict between Pakistan and India. Eventually, the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor is expected to entail highways, pipelines, 
power plants, optical connections and railways. Analysts expect that 
greater linkages between the restive province of Xinjiang and Central 
Asia will lead to significant economic and national security dividends. 
At the sea port of Gwadar, the China–Pakistan Economic 
Corridor meets the Maritime Silk Road (see Figure 4) which gives 
China access to the Indian Ocean with its important sea routes, 
including oil and gas from the Middle East. 
For many collaborating provinces and external countries, the BRI 
is a welcome source of much needed infrastructure investments to 
tackle infrastructural gaps and to stimulate more trade. For others, the 
potential BRI threats outweigh the benefits (Table 1). BRI has been 
interpreted as an attempt to create a new world order with China as 
Figure 3.  Northern sea route
Source: http://www.grida.no/resources/7150; Maps by Hugo Ahlenius, UNEP/
GRID-Arendal.
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Figure 4.  China–Pakistan economic corridor
Source: Nikkei Asian Review 28/3/2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/
Is-China-s-Belt-and-Road-working-A-progress-report-from-eight-countries.
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Table 1.  SWOT analysis of BRI based on several media articles, including a report 
in The Economist, 26th July 2018, entitled “China’s belt-and-road plans are to be 
welcomed — and worried about”
Strengths Opportunities
• China has massive expertise in 
infrastructure development know how 
(roads, tunnels, bridges, high-speed 
rail projects)
• Source of much needed infrastructure 
investment to stimulate more trade
• Creation of new funding institutions 
by China (e.g. Silk Road Fund, Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank)
• Better local, regional and global 
connectivity as well as novel trading 
networks
• Good business prospects for 
builders of roads, railways, ports 
and power stations
• More prosperity for less-developed 
economies (e.g. in Central Asia)
• Novel cofinancing opportunities for 
joint BRI investments by China, 
the European Commission (EC) 
and multilateral institutions such as 
the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) or the World Bank 
• Stimuli for regional economic 
growth
Weaknesses Threats
• No master plan with detailed targets 
and milestones to be achieved
• Heavy reliance on Chinese labour 
rather than local manpower resources
• Opaque governance and little 
transparency with regard to (Chinese) 
decision-making and returns on 
capital in BRI regions
• “Easy” Chinese financing might lead 
to “white infrastructural elephants”
• Attempt to create a new world 
order with China as preeminent 
power (new hegemony)
• Debt burden cum dependency 
(“debt trap diplomacy”) and 
possibility of potential IMF bailouts
• Security risks arising as a result of 
creating a string of ports and berths 
for China’s navy with global reach
• Potential military confrontation 
between China and the US over 
regional leadership, including the 
contested South China Sea
preeminent power. There is concern that China’s new partnerships in 
(Eastern) Europe could have a negative effect on the integration pro-
ject of the EU (with its emphasis on “good” governance, democracy 
and human rights), which overlaps with Russia’s Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU) project. Another worry is the potential debt burden 
cum dependency (“debt trap diplomacy”) of mega infrastructure 
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projects funded by China. Sceptics have pointed to security risks 
which may arise as a result of creating a string of ports and berths for 
China’s navy extending its global reach. 
In Sri Lanka, for example, China financed the construction of a 
new sea port in Hambantota with state-owned China Merchants 
eventually holding a majority stake after Sri Lanka encountered diffi-
culties in the loan repayment. Additionally, a small group of China 
watchers have stressed the potential of a military confrontation 
between China and the US over regional leadership, including the 
contested South China Sea.
BRI’s track record since it was unveiled in late 2013 suggests that 
China has become a champion of globalisation and an advocate of 
inclusive growth, filling a gap left by the more protectionist stance of 
the USA. In many Southeast Asian nations, BRI is regarded as a new 
force for regional economic integration — filling a vacuum created by 
the cessation of the Trans-Pacific Pact (TPP).
Structure of the Reader and Contributors
The book’s contents are aimed at discussing the following broad 
questions: 
• What is the programmatic focus of BRI (beyond infrastructure 
investments or power grids) and its impact on selected partner 
countries who are involved in it?
• What explains China’s growing proactivism in international affairs? 
• How will BRI modify the geopolitical order in Asia and how do 
Asian countries respond? 
• What is the role of the China-led AIIB vis-à-vis traditional devel-
opment banks such as the ADB?
• What motivates China to finance these infrastructure-driven eco-
nomic growth strategies in selected regional land corridors/belts 
and what are potential development outcomes? 
• What is the impact of Chinese capital and infrastructure invest-
ments on Sino–Southeast Asian economic relations in general and 
Southeast Asia’s maritime trade routes in particular? 
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• How do Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia view China-
financed BRI projects and what long-term geopolitical scenario is 
likely to arise with regard to the contested South China Sea? 
• Why and how do countries in Central Asia like Kazakhstan partici-
pate in the Eurasian transcontinental corridor “Economic belt of 
the Silk Road”? 
• How and under what conditions is economic power captured by 
China through the BRI? 
• How will China’s increasing geoeconomic power translate into 
geopolitical power? 
In Chapter 1, Dai Shiyan, Wang Xiangquan and Yang Yang 
(“External Challenges Arising from BRI Development and Approaches 
for Solutions”) provide insights into the increasing number of BRI 
projects worldwide in areas such as transport infrastructure, energy 
development and industrial park construction. External challenges 
include concerns that the further development of BRI will lead to an 
over-reliance on China, socio-cultural cum language barriers between 
BRI-involved nations and China, weak regulatory systems (e.g. 
finance), disputes over borderlines, investment risks and so forth. As 
the authors argue, effective communication can help BRI stakehold-
ers achieve a good mutual understanding of the objectives and signifi-
cance of BRI, “which could be more important than the hardware 
facilities of connectivity among the countries along the Belt and Road 
routes”. They conclude that China is well advised to further enhance 
the external communication and publicity about BRI as there have 
been growing concerns about this gigantic blueprint.
Gary Hawke sheds light on the complex issue of how to absorb 
the new BRI (which he views as a vision, not a plan) into an interna-
tional economic architecture in Chapter 2, “Economic Historical 
Development and Leadership Underlying the BRI Strategy”. He 
discusses how the BRI can accommodate the various economic sys-
tems in a synergetic, positive and peaceful fashion vis-à-vis the narra-
tive of China’s past humiliation and the historical primacy of the USA 
in Asia-Pacific. As he concludes his wide-ranging politico-economic 
analysis of BRI, which also sheds new light on its multiple security 
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dimensions vis-à-vis Washington’s strategic competition consensus, 
he notes that “… it takes time for the new to become familiar. In a 
situation where one economy is gaining a leadership position while 
another’s is declining, the novel is especially threatening.” The devel-
opment of the 21st century BRI will test China’s peaceful rising, espe-
cially by those affected outside of China.
In Chapter 3 (“Frontier Infrastructure: OBOR and Northern Sea 
Route (NSR) in Comparative Perspective”), Christopher M. Dent 
introduces the concept of “frontier infrastructure” as an analytical 
device to explain both the nature and historic significance of the BRI 
and the NSR. He discusses how this discourse plays out in current 
debates about the governance and promotion of international trade 
in the 21st century. As illustrated in Figure 3, the NSR connects the 
Barents Sea near Russia’s border with Norway with the Bering Strait 
between Siberia and Alaska. Melting ice sheets as a consequence of 
climate change suggest that the NSR might become an alternative 
maritime route by 2040, making the Suez Canal less important in the 
long run. 
How the BRI impacts Central Asia in general and Kazakhstan in 
particular is discussed in Chapter 4, “The Belt and Road Initiative: 
Case of Kazakhstan” by Batzhan Akmoldina, Sara Alpysbayeva and 
Zhanna Kapsalyamova. Kazakhstan is landlocked and the biggest of 
the Central Asian countries by land mass. With vast oil and natural gas 
reserves, it is strategically positioned as a trade and logistics hub 
between China, Europe and South Asia to become the logistical heart 
of Eurasia. Kazakhstan participates in three directions of the Eurasian 
transcontinental corridor “Economic belt of the Silk Road”: 
(i) China–Kazakhstan–Russia–Europe, with access to the Baltic Sea; 
(ii) China–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Pakistan, with access to 
the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and (iii) China–Kazakhstan–
Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey–Europe, within the framework of the 
international Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) 
program, with access to the Black and Mediterranean Seas. The 
TRACECA program was launched at a conference in Brussels in 1993 
to create a transport corridor on a West–East axis from Europe, across 
the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central 
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Asia. TRACECA members include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. How the country 
will continue to manage its relations with China, Russia, the EU and 
the US will be an interesting lesson in statecraft. Common ground 
entails promoting domestic and regional economic growth, strength-
ening regional security, mastering digitization and enhancing institu-
tional efficiency. 
In Chapter 5 (“Financing the OBOR Initiative”), Joseph Lim and 
Deborah Lim take a closer look at the gigantic BRI financing needs. 
While China has sponsored and financed many BRI projects like those 
in Pakistan, Sri Lanka or Laos, they argue that it cannot shoulder the 
financing burden alone. Without private capital and national govern-
ments serving as equity holders, the BRI is unlikely to succeed. Many 
BRI projects are located in developing countries whose political lead-
ers struggle with their national finances. Particular challenges include 
the management of sovereign risk, systemic investment risks and 
exchange risks. What is needed are new mechanisms for redistributing 
the risks that debt holders are facing in conjunction with other risk 
amelioration measures such as tranching, investing through a special 
purpose vehicle (which is an entity incorporated for the purpose of 
investing in the bonds of a BRI project), contingent convertible bonds 
or special infrastructure funds. According to their analysis, there can 
be no doubt that the nodes along the “belt and road” will see a parallel 
development of the (much-needed) financial infrastructure.
The (arguably) “irreconcilable rivalry” between China and Japan 
in regional cooperation in the areas of finance and trade forms the 
core subject of Chapter 6 by Shintaro Hamanaka (“Explaining 
Irreconcilable Sino–Japan Rivalry”). There are fundamental differ-
ences with regard to policy preferences between both countries. 
While China prefers goods-centric free trade agreements (FTAs) and 
supports international financial institutions (IFIs) to finance infra-
structure development measures in support of trade facilitation such 
as transport infrastructure, Japan places emphasis on more compre-
hensive development approaches “beyond just lending money”, 
including regulatory reforms and the establishment of regulatory 
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standards (e.g. environmental standards) of partner countries. The 
“irreconcilable rivalry” argument is further developed with reference 
to the trade-related Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as well as the workings 
and rationale of finance-related institutions such as the AIIB and the 
ADB. Whether the stated rivalry will eventually lead to more harmony 
amongst regional powers like China/Japan (and the US) and con-
structive negotiations for mutual benefits as a result of ever-evolving 
geopolitical dynamics remains to be seen.  
A Southeast Asian perspective of BRI is provided by Xue Gong 
and Li Mingjiang in Chapter 7, “The Belt and Road Initiative: 
Progress and Prospect in Southeast Asia”. The authors contrast the 
different responses of three groups of countries vis-à-vis the prospects 
of BRI in order to assess how it may make progress in the region: 
(i) Cambodia, Brunei, Thailand and Singapore; (ii) Malaysia, Indonesia 
and the Philippines and (iii) Vietnam and Myanmar. A case in point is 
Malaysia under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad 
which has suspended work on multibillion infrastructure projects such 
as the US$20 billion East Coast Rail Link project (agreed upon dur-
ing the Najib administration) due to concerns about affordability and 
debt servicing. There are also strategic concerns with regard to the 
free movement of ships through the South China Sea and the Strait 
of Malacca. 
In Chapter 8, Hans-Dieter Evers, Abdul Rahman Embong and 
Rashila Ramli examine “The Impact of Chinese Maritime Policy on 
Malaysia: A Long-term Geopolitical Scenario”. Their paper concen-
trates on the maritime part of this development policy, which entails 
heavy infrastructure investments in ports and railroads, and real-estate 
property developments, for instance, satellite cities and/or condo-
miniums, offered for sale mainly to Chinese citizens. According to 
their analysis, there will be obvious commercial benefits to economies 
along the Southern Silk Road, but also geopolitical effects like 
increasing political dependency due to Chinese capital investments 
and acquisition of property rights in ports and condominiums. 
Regarding these developments, a Malaysian maritime policy is called 
for to match BRI and the Indonesian Maritime Fulcrum, as well as 
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ASEAN integration. Indonesia’s “Global Maritime Fulcrum” refers 
to the country’s grand maritime vision to turn Indonesia into a “ful-
crum” of Indo-Pacific maritime activity. Strategic goals include the 
development of Indonesia’s Navy into a regional maritime power and 
to create a more interconnected Indonesia with modern ports, fisher-
ies and shipping. This includes the upgrading of Indonesia’s naval 
base at Natuna Island. As China and Indonesia have overlapping 
claims on maritime rights in the South China Sea, the future maritime 
security environment is set to become more challenging.
Chapter 9 (“China’s Belt and Road Initiative and ASEAN’s 
Maritime Clusters”) by Hans-Dieter Evers and Thomas Menkhoff 
deals with the potential impact of BRI on maritime clusters in 
Southeast Asia. It makes a case for further examining the possible 
effects of the complementary “Maritime Silk Road” on maritime clus-
ters involving Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Whether China’s 
heavy investments in land and maritime infrastructure in Indonesia 
and Malaysia will lead to the development of strong and dense mari-
time clusters with deep connectivity and complementary (maritime) 
subclusters for mutual socio-economic development benefits remains 
to be seen. Academic research to better understand these trends, as 
well as the creation of a comprehensive maritime policy, is advocated 
for ASEAN nations.
In Chapter 10 (“Strategic Linkages: China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative and Power Capture through Global Value Chains”), Pan 
Zhengqi examines an important aspect of the BRI: the development 
of international relations networks of countries economically and 
politically linked by the BRI that in turn make them increasingly 
dependent on one another (with China as the strategic core in the 
network of geoeconomic and geopolitical relations). The author 
argues that dense GVC linkages formed by the BRI with China as the 
hub will not only result in disproportionately large trade and invest-
ment benefits for China, but also considerable financial gains through 
the greater use and internationalization of the renminbi (RMB). 
Importantly, increasing trade and financial connections between 
China and the rest of the BRI countries will lead to a more compre-
hensive diplomacy, albeit the effects of China’s direct political 
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influence being constrained by scepticism regarding debt trap diplo-
macy. However, the overall geopolitical ramifications of the BRI 
remain salient: China’s BRI can be seen as a grand strategy to decrease 
dependence on and influence of the American-led liberal world order. 
In Chapter 11 “Sustaining the Momentum of the Belt and Road 
Initiative”, Andrew Elek discusses some of the key enablers of BRI’s 
long-term viability and sustainability such as efficient infrastructure 
maintenance and operationality, objective project monitoring, high 
and sustained level of policy coordination as well as the generation of 
sound economic rates of return. As he argues, all this will require 
huge improvements in the skills, institutional capacity and policy envi-
ronment of most of the countries involved: “A system with one domi-
nant leader — China — will be a massive aid program rather than any 
new model of cooperation.” The main pillars of building BRI include: 
(i) the generation of mutual trust and mutual respect among a very 
diverse group of countries, (ii) shared leadership of the process, 
(iii) reaching win-win agreements on priorities and targets, (iv) shar-
ing responsibility for efficient project design, construction, operation 
and maintenance and (v) mobilization of the massive funds that are 
required. He concludes that the future of the BRI remains uncertain 
as several of the challenges above have yet to be tackled effectively. 
In the concluding chapter, Linda Low writes that China is forg-
ing ahead with globalising the BRI, albeit with Chinese characteris-
tics; “doing by its own way”. China has arrived in a more challenging 
bipolar world with the USA’s more domestically focused “to be 
great again” somewhat eclipsed as China’s BRI continues to trans-
form its domestic economy and the destiny of some of the partici-
pating nations. The novel BRI is China’s approach to becoming a 
powerful global leader by building new investment links and trading 
networks regionally and internationally along the old Silk Road. The 
“21st Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative is yet another approach 
to capitalise on geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages amid the 
current global and regional uncertainty. This initiative is planned to 
promote maritime-related development in countries adjoining the 
South China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. 
Creating maritime clusters around port cities will help to satisfy 
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Chinese geopolitical needs for secure trade routes. The creation of 
these maritime clusters will further fulfil the participating states’ 
need for vibrant port cities and effective maritime economies, pro-
vided project implementation efforts with cluster effects are viable, 
sustainable and confidence-building.
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